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Este artigo examina a moderação de narrativas de 
conspiração sobre COVID-19 por meio de métodos 
digitais. Com base na literatura sobre moderação, ele 
realiza uma comparação dos tipos de conteúdo moderados 
pelo YouTube de Abril à Outubro de 2020. O artigo busca 
determinar até que ponto as ações de moderação são trazidas 
como parte das narrativas conspiratórias em torno da 
pandemia, enquanto investiga como sua moderação se 
envolve com questões de verdade e visibilidade.
Palavras-chave: moderação de conteúdos, teorias de conspiração, 
YouTube.
ABSTRACT 
This article examines YouTube’s moderation of conspiracy 
narratives surrounding COVID-19 through an analysis of 
deplatformed and demoted YouTube videos. Building upon the 
literature on moderation, it compares the types of content moderated 
by YouTube from April to October, 2020. In doing so, it seeks to 
determine the extent to which YouTube’s own moderation actions 
are brought in as part of the conspiratorial narratives surrounding 
COVID-19, while investigating how it is that moderation 
becomes entangled with questions of truth and visibility.
Keywords: content moderation; conspiracy theories; 
YouTube.
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Introduction
There are many truths stranger than fiction, but none so strange as the emergence of the COVID-19 pan-demic at the nadir of a half-decade of expanding 
fault-lines in the legitimation of public narratives. Com-
pounding this is the fact that even among public health 
authorities, information about the origin, treatment, and 
prevention of COVID-19 has not always been certain — 
from whether the virus has leaked from a lab in Wuhan, 
to whether asymptomatic people can contaminate others, 
or if children can be contagious (Iati et al., 2020; O’Leary, 
2020). This has driven an imperative for mainstream so-
cial media platforms to foster consensus among its user 
bases, by for example raising up “authoritative sources” 
on top of search ranking and recommendation results on 
YouTube and Google Search (Skopeliti and John, 2020), 
or setting up centralised reference points to the latest 
local guidelines and information found on the virus on 
Twitter homepages (Roth and Pickels, 2020). 
The problem, it seems, is that these actively mod-
erated platforms are often subject to the misinformation 
they seek to shut down. In US YouTube infospheres in 
particular (see, e.g., Flam 2021), they have been charac-
terised by users as “big tech” infrastructures that control 
the flow of information about sensitive truths, motivated 
to subvert individuals’ self-determination in favour of 
authoritarian entities (Connolly, 2020). To intervene 
directly in the “meanings and meaningfulness” of user-
generated contents (Langlois, 2014) renders moderation 
an “essentially contested” governance measure (de Laat, 
2012): moderation policies are perceived as drawing ex-
ternal, and thus arbitrary, lines between what users can and 
cannot claim to be true. From here, a core tension between 
human-based interventions and platform infrastructures 
emerges: moderation is a case-by-case answer to the de-
gree to which platforms, within their own infrastructure, 
simultaneously incentivize and adjudicate the production 
of misinformation (Burton and Koehorst, 2020). 
How, then, is the relationship between platforms 
and moderated users affected by the former’s adjudications 
as to what is authoritative information on COVID-19? 
Answering this question requires that we first explore 
how COVID-19 misinformation is moderated over time, 
namely how content moderation policies qualify con-
tents related to COVID-19 as authoritative, misleading 
or false, and how content moderation measures execute 
these policies in the form of sorting, ranking or deletion 
techniques. We chose to examine the moderation of eight 
currently unconfirmed allegations and conspiracy theories 
on YouTube, in English, between April and November of 
2020. We first close-read YouTube’s anti-misinformation 
content moderation policies, namely Spam, deceptive 
practices and scams (YouTube, 2021) and COVID-19 
Medical misinformation (YouTube, 2020). Repurposing 
the YouTube video downloader youtube-dl (sic), we built 
a dataset of 108,537 videos and 31,531,963 comments 
by collecting the first 60 search results of 98 queries that 
reflect COVID-19 conspiracy vernaculars (Qanon hashtag 
“wwg1wga” [when we go one, we go all], “id2020” [CO-
VID-19 vaccine microchip], and “covid depopulation”, 
among others). We then captured moderation informa-
tion, such as video statuses and daily search rankings. 
We chose to study YouTube because metadata tied to its 
content moderation, such as the rankings of search results 
or information on the availability of videos, remain more 
accessible than in other platforms thanks to scraping 
tools like youtube-dl (Garcia Gonzalez et al. 2021). This 
also applies to access to user-generated contents, such as 
video metadata, transcripts and user comments. 
Secondarily, we assessed how users qualify You-
Tube as a source of information in relation to the platform’s 
moderation efforts. We used a combination of natural 
language processing techniques, namely word trees (Wat-
tenberg and Viegas, 2008) of comment sentences contain-
ing words relating to demotion, deplatforming and other 
speech restrictions (“shadowbanned”, banned, censored...) 
and subject-verb-object networks (Milajevs, Sadrzadeh 
and Roelleke, 2015) of comment sentences claiming what 
YouTube is and does in relation to moderation.
Our study contributes to two existing areas of 
research: content moderation and user studies in relation 
to moderation. We find that, in burying down conspirato-
rial contents and prioritising “authoritative” sources like 
mainstream media and public health experts, YouTube 
places a degree of attention on allegations of censorship 
contained in such theories. When user discussions and 
substantiations of conspiracy theories are pushed off the 
platform, this provides conspiratorial thinkers (1) proof that 
YouTube is a partisan platform whose moderation policies 
apply the repressive politics of COVID-wary politicians 
and (2) evidence they use to prove said theories, such as 
footage of politicians, pundits and celebrities discussing 
the implications of the virus. In this sense, we conclude 
that moderation separates the production and the archiving 
of misinformation: while YouTube’s moderation policies 
make it an inhospitable place for deliberating conspiracies, 
it remains a platform by and for the conspirators.
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Deplatforming, demotion and 
factual contingencies
Moderation has never been an oddity to social 
media platforms: Tarleton Gillespie goes so far as to define 
platforms as existing for their moderation (Gillespie, 2018). 
Still, recent commentaries express a certain surprise for 
an apparent shift of ethos in platform discourse (Gillespie, 
2013): active moderation marks a clear rupture from early 
Facebook, Twitter, and Google’s self-promotion as open, 
free or participatory alternatives to mass media. This 
perceived change has been the target of legal scholars 
concerned with platforms’s monopoly over the regula-
risation of public speech, which some suspect parallels 
censorship or bias (Jiang, Robertson and Wilson, 2019; 
Lee, 2020). In response to this, many studies today argue 
in favour of a “democratisation” of platform moderation 
with collaborative or participative techniques (De Gregorio, 
2020), delegating them to civil society (Elkin-Koren and 
Perel, 2020), or providing sufficient context for decisions 
to sanction, quarantine, or delete user-generated contents 
(Myers West, 2018; Wilson and Land, 2020). 
In this context, empirical studies have examined the 
contingent ways in which platforms intervene within public 
deliberations of what constitutes right, wrong, true and false 
information by sorting, ranking and deleting user-generated 
contents that step outside their jurisdictional boundaries 
(Rieder, 2017). One of the most prominent techniques so 
far has been the outright suspension, deletion or “deplat-
forming” of users or contents (c.f. Rogers 2020) and other 
research on the “replatforming” of deleted contents in 
alternative platform ecologies (OILab, 2019). Rogers gives 
reason to believe that Twitter suspensions have constituted 
an effective strategy for reducing hate speech and related 
contents (Rogers, 2020, pp. 13–15), based on the fact that 
early provocateurs such as Milo Yiannopolous and Alex 
Jones have mellowed their language while their audiences 
have thinned on the platforms they migrated to. Similar 
claims have been made about Reddit’s “crowdsourced” 
moderation (Chandrasekharan et al., 2021) and YouTube’s 
deletion of high-profile conspiracy contents, such as 
Plandemic, a documentary that claims COVID-19 was a 
planned hoax (Frenkel, Decker and Alba, 2020). 
Contrary to hate speech, however, COVID-19 has 
brought specific challenges to deplatforming (Douek, 2021; 
de Keulenaar et al., forthcoming). While information on 
COVID-19 bears critical health risks, the spectrum of true 
and false information on the virus changes as its epide-
miology and public health policies has evolved. Simple 
speculations about the virus have emerged alongside more 
elaborate conspiracy theories (Knight, 2021), which, as 
with claims that the virus leaked from a lab in Wuhan 
(Maxmen & Mallapaty, 2021), have at times shifted their 
status from fringe statements to reasonable doubt. This 
makes it difficult for platforms to opt for outright deletion 
of “false” or “misleading” contents without being sub-
jected to a loss of legitimacy, be it caused by accusations 
of epistemic bias or infringements upon public rights to 
consult information for individual decision-making. 
Like its counterparts, then, YouTube has had 
to find a balance between allowing users to openly 
speculate about the virus and public health policies, and 
preventing misleading or false information from pos-
sibly causing harm. Juggling one and the other extreme 
implies a combination of flexible and strict moderation 
techniques — “hard” and “soft” moderation — including 
deplatforming, demotion (down-ranking) and promo-
tion (up-ranking) of “authoritative sources” in search 
and recommendation results (Faddoul, 2020). 
Aside from deplatforming, demotion has been 
studied specifically in relation to search ranking and 
recommendation mechanisms. While deplatforming may 
strictly delimit the boundaries of acceptable user behav-
iour, demotion works to modulate the prominence of 
problematic contents in the overall assemblage of the 
platform. Since at least 2015, YouTube has focused on 
tweaking its ranking algorithms to control the visibility 
of  “authoritative” and “borderline contents”, namely by 
down- or up-ranking each of these types of contents dy-
namically (YouTube, 2019a). This technique is designed 
to prevent potentially problematic contents from gather-
ing too much engagement before they infringe YouTube 
content moderation rules.  Describing Facebook’s own 
demotion techniques, Constine (2018) notes that this 
measure gives a certain flexibility to content modera-
tion by supervising contents that approach the “policy 
line” separating allowed from prohibited contents. 
To understand the motive of demotion techniques, 
it is useful to look closely at what platforms mean by 
“borderline contents”. On YouTube, “borderline contents” 
is a term that appeared in June of 2019, a moment when 
the platform was under heavy criticism for allowing the 
circulation of historical revisionist, scientific racist and 
conspiratorial contents (Lewis, 2018; Ekman 2014). At 
the time, such contents did not immediately infringe upon 
the platform’s guidelines, but could arguably inform and 
at times incite violent behaviour, as evidenced in the 
Charlottesville “Unite the Right” rally of August 2017 
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(Lind 2017). YouTube’s solution to closing this gap was 
to find a concept that could frame inchoate dangers: 
“borderline contents” indeed refers to what “comes close 
to — but doesn’t quite cross the line of — violating our 
Community Guidelines” (YouTube, 2019a; YouTube, 
2021), with examples as varied as “videos promoting 
a phony miracle cure for a serious illness, claiming the 
earth is flat, making blatantly false claims about historic 
events like 9/11” (The YouTube Team, 2019). 
By the beginning of the pandemic, demotion 
techniques on YouTube had also gained an educational 
function. While earlier efforts to raise authoritative con-
tents may have been designed to counter-balance misin-
formation, the gravity and scale of COVID-19 has made 
it necessary to foster public consensus for local health 
policies and effectively funnel users down to common 
sources of information. Besides burying down poten-
tially problematic contents on search and recommenda-
tion results, then,  YouTube actively up-ranked what it 
called “authoritative” or “trusted sources”, which are 
described as mainstream journalistic outlets like “CNN, 
Fox News, Jovem Pan, India Today and the Guardian”, 
experts in given fields, such as “public health institu-
tions” and local authorities (YouTube, 2021b). 
This represents something of a shift for a platform 
that has long been perceived as running on user-generated 
content. By observing the top twenty unpersonalized 
results of four queries over a period of time, Rieder et 
al. find that YouTube’s role in determining the ranking 
of search results is typically only partial: it combines 
user strategies to up-rank competitors, user engage-
ment (views, up- and down votes, comments, subscrip-
tions) and what the platform classifies as worthy of 
consumption based on relevance, recency, and user’s 
affinity with recommended contents (Davidson et al., 
2010; Covington, Adams and Sargin, 2016). Any platform 
intervention implies a careful “mediation or curation of 
[user-generated] content and, consequently, of perspec-
tives or viewpoints”, including around different concep-
tions of “importance” and “authoritativeness” (Rieder, 
Matamoros-Fernández and Coromina, 2018, p. 52). 
YouTube’s efforts to introduce external criteria for 
ranking algorithms imply a problematic relationship with 
user feedback. Contrary to notions of “importance” or “pop-
ularity” informed by user behavior, “authoritative sources” 
represent an external criteria independent from user pref-
erences. Content moderation and the political and public 
health implications that render it necessary may thus signal 
a rupture from previous platform designs as seemingly ethe-
real spaces by and for users (Gillespie, 2013). How, then, 
do more proactive content moderation policies affect CO-
VID-19 misinformation as user-generated content?
Figure 1. Constine’s representation of the demotion technique in Facebook’s Newsfeed 
algorithm (in Constine, J. (2018) ‘Facebook will change algorithm to demote “borderline 
content” that almost violates policies’, TechCrunch, 15 November. Available at: https://social.
techcrunch.com/2018/11/15/facebook-borderline-content/ (Accessed: 20 February 2021).
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Figure 2. YouTube’s timeline of actions taken to 
raise authoritative contents and reduce the spread of 
borderline content since 2015. In YouTube (2021) The 
Four Rs of Responsibility, Part 2: Raising authoritative 
content and reducing borderline content and harmful 
misinformation, blog.youtube. Available at:
Method
The question of how YouTube’s moderation prac-
tices affect COVID-19 misinformation requires us to first 
examine how the platform moderates the latter. In order 
to answer this question, we built a dataset of videos and 
comments mentioning one or various COVID-19 con-
spiracy queries between April and November of 2020. We 
then examine how users respond to YouTube moderation, 
as well as how they frame YouTube within COVID-19 
conspiracies. We use two natural language processing 
techniques to “distant read” (Moretti, 2013) comments 
that debate moderation and YouTube, namely word trees 
(Wattenberg and Viegas, 2008) and subject-verb-object 
networks (Milajevs, Sadrzadeh and Roelleke, 2015). 
In contrast to contemporary YouTube studies (Ar-
thurs, Drakopoulou, and Gandini 2018), we chose to avoid 
the usage of YouTube’s API interface to collect our data, 
instead using the youtube-dl program alongside scripting 
mechanisms to build our own database. YouTube’s attempt 
to self-regulate the spread of misinformation on its plat-
form have occurred in lockstep with growing restrictions 
on mainstream social platforms for researchers to query, 
access, and analyze data through the API (Bruns 2019). 
These restrictions tend to centre around data collection 
that allows users to critique and investigate the operations 
of the platform’s technical structures (Rieder, 2018). The 
question of this “post-API” evolution in digital methods has 
been well-documented by scholars over the past three years 
(see, for example, Freelon 2018 and Perriam et. al., 2019), 
with the idea that decreasing access illustrates the tenuous 
nature of access to digital data. The “APICalypse”, in the 
words of Axel Bruns, introduces difficulties in studying 
“phenomena such as abuse, hate speech, trolling, and disin-
formation campaigns” alongside the role that the platforms 
play in the circulation and iteration of these behaviours 
(Bruns, 2019). The dynamism of our research design–for 
example, the method we developed to track the deletion 
of videos–would have faced considerable difficulties if 
we restricted our data source to the YouTube API. 
Query design
Our queries were designed based on conspiracy 
theories reported by news media up to late March 2020, 
and vernaculars proper to messaging boards known to 
produce such conspiracies (de Zeeuw et al., 2020), par-
ticularly 4chan’s /pol/ board and 8kun (formerly 8chan). 
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Conspiracy theories or claims included the idea that CO-
VID-19 is a Chinese or American bioweapon; that 5G is 
the cause of COVID-19; that Bill Gates has known about 
the pandemic beforehand and is profiting from it; or that 
it is simply a hoax (Knight and Birchall, 2020). 
These conspiracies translated into 98 queries 
in total, though we ultimately narrowed our analysis 
to four queries: “id2020”, “wwg1wga”, “depopula-
tion” and “5g radiation”. This is because we wanted to 
test search rankings for different types of moderated 
misinformation: while terms like “depopulation” and 
“wwg1wga” may be likely to be classified as “border-
line content”, “id2020” and “5g radiation” are listed in 
YouTube’s COVID-19 Medical Misinformation Policy 
as contradicting the World Health Organisation or public 
health authorities. Though similar in substance, these 
two types of misinformation are described and moder-
ated differently according to YouTube policies. 
Data collection
With these queries, we used youtube-dl (Gar-
cia Gonzalez, Amine and M., 2021), an open-source 
command-line program to download videos and audio 
from YouTube. Youtube-dl allows one to capture meta-
data including channel names, channel IDs, video IDs, 
video comments, video transcripts, engagement (views, 
likes and dislikes), search rankings, and video status 
(e.g., “This video has been removed due to copyright.”). 
Due to the propensity of conspiracy videos to be plat-
form-moderated, our youtube-dl script was scheduled 
Table 1. List of queries and their corresponding claims or conspiracy theories.
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to obtain the first three pages of search results for all 98 
queries, every 20 minutes of every day, between April 
and October 2020. Our results, summarized in Table 2, 
indicate that April was a particularly active month for 
our queries, while June 2020 saw the explicit deletion of 
many videos that initially landed in our database.
Understanding YouTube’s 
moderation of COVID-19 
misinformation
We used the Wayback Machine’s “Changes” tool 
to perform a close-reading analysis of YouTube’s anti-
misinformation policies throughout the pandemic (Way-
back Machine, 2020). We focused on two policies: (1) 
COVID-19 Medical Misinformation (YouTube, 2020) and 
(2) Spam, deceptive practices & scams (YouTube, 2021a), 
taking note of (a) the contents they deem problematic; and 
(b) the moderation techniques they use to sanction them. 
From these policies, we gathered information on two main 
content moderation measures: namely, the manipulation of 
search ranking status and the outright removal of content. 
The former manifests in demoting “borderline content 
and harmful misinformation” and up-ranking “authorita-
tive sources”; the latter consists of suspending or deleting 
“contents that contradict the World Health Organisation 
and local health authorities” (YouTube, 2020). 
As mentioned earlier, borderline contents refer 
to “videos, comments or channels that do not fall under 
ban-worthy status for violating the platform’s community 
guidelines, but [come] close to — but [don’t] quite cross the 
line of — violating our Community Guidelines” (YouTube, 
2021b). Elsewhere, YouTube describes them as videos 
“promoting a phony miracle cure for a serious illness, claim-
ing the earth is flat, or making blatantly false claims about 
historic events like 9/11” (YouTube, 2019b). Though not 
explicitly phrased as such, we interpreted these examples 
as referring to conspiracy theories and historical revisionist 
contents. “Borderline” is the label we gave to videos arguing 
in favour of COVID-19 conspiracy claims (“WARNING! 
Digital IDs Will Be Forced On YOU SOON! Why!?” or 
“Coronavirus COVID-19 | Unfolding Revelation | Agenda 
ID2020”) — distinct, here, from interrogative or speculative 
titles (“Are Chip Implants the ‘Mark of the Beast?’”). We 
manually coded all search results for the queries “id2020”, 
“wwg1wga”, “depopulation” and “5g radiation”. As above, 
we automatically coded (mainstream) news sources for 
every search result of our four chosen queries. 
Demotion
YouTube describes demotion as up-ranking or 
“raising” authoritative contents in search results, includ-
ing news media and other trusted institutional sources 
Table 2. Total number of videos and comments per month, including videos deleted by YouTube or users.
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(YouTube, 2021b). It also claims that “borderline contents” 
are buried in search and recommendation results intention-
ally (The YouTube Team, 2019). To trace the demotion of 
videos by borderline channels, we used YouTube search 
rankings metadata. In three scatterplots, we visualised the 
ranking position of result per (1) authoritative and border-
line quality and (2) query (see Table 1), keeping in mind 
the number of deplatformed videos per month.  
Deplatforming
To complement the restrictions on metadata and 
API limits, we used youtube-dl to track the status of videos 
that fell under our query. Between April and June 2020, 
we were able to track the approximate day that videos 
previously appearing in query results were no longer 
available, alongside the message given by YouTube upon 
visiting a video that was previously captured. We found 
a total of 4,101 deplatformed videos in June of 2020. To 
determine why these videos were sanctioned, we first 
examined the status labels of deleted videos, per query. 
A majority were not assigned a query, as queries were 
registered only by the time we began collecting search 
ranking results in April of 2020. Before then, videos were 
assigned all queries indiscriminately. In order to determine 
their contents, we extracted the most prominent words in 
their audio transcripts using tf-idf (Ramos, 2003).
Mining for user comments  
on moderation
In order to discover how users relate to and discuss the 
impact of moderation on their platform activity, we processed 
the collected comments of users on the above set of YouTube 
videos and processed them with word trees — a graphical 
Figure 3. Analysing YouTube’s moderation of COVID-19 conspiracies.
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version of keyword-in-contexts (Wattenberg and Viegas, 
2008, p. 1221) — and subject-verb-object sentence analysis 
(Milajevs, Sadrzadeh and Roelleke, 2015). The sentences we 
extracted were filtered with a list of terms about moderation: 
“youtube”, “big tech” or “google” and “deplatform*”, “shad-
owbann*”, “demot*”, “demonetis*” or “demonetiz*”, “sus-
pend*”, “remov*”, “cancel*”, “modera*”, banned. 
Our method was informed by Tangherlini et. al.’s 
Automated pipeline for the discovery of conspiracy and 
conspiracy theory narrative frameworks (Tangherlini et 
al., 2020), an ensemble of combined natural language 
processing techniques that consist in extracting syntactic 
and semantic elements of conspiracy theories from “noisy” 
social media posts and visualizing them as storytelling 
networks. We reconstructed subject-verb-object relations 
by extracting the relations between named entities; filtering 
relations based on their reference to conspiratorial narra-
tives; and then filtering resulting networks based on their 
relationship to particular COVID-19 conspiracy themes. 
We did this by implementing the Python word2vec library 
(Rodriguez, 2020), which maps the n-grammatic relations 
between words through neural networking algorithms. 
Our basic subjects included “youtube”, “google”, “big 
tech”, “facebook”, and “twitter”; our verbs were those 
associated with moderation, such as “cancel”, “remove”, 
“delete”, “suspend”, “demonetize”; and conspiracy terms 
included in the query list of Table 2. We then normalized 
the verbs by lemmatizing them and normalized platform 
shorthands like “yt” and “fb” into their full referents. 
The results of this can be found in Figure 13.
Methodological obstacles
To investigate demotion and deplatforming, we 
had to extract data that was not available from You-
Tube’s API. To investigate deplatforming, for example, 
Figure 4. Analyzing user reactions to moderation.
Deplatforming, demotion and folk theories of Big Tech persecution
revista Fronteiras - estudos midiáticos                    Vol. 23 Nº 2 - maio/agosto 2021                    127
tive practices and scam” (YouTube, 2021a). YouTube’s 
anti-scam policies deal specifically with what the plat-
form classifies as “misleading content”, such as false 
video metadata, blackmail and extortion among users. 
Sanctions are placed proactively, dispensing user labels 
and reports for content detection and deletion. 
It was not until later that year that “misinforma-
tion” is mentioned specifically in the context of ongoing 
efforts to contain extreme and conspiratorial contents 
off the platform (YouTube, 2019b). In the context of 
COVID-19, “misinformation” or “misleading videos” 
are counterweighted by “authoritative sources”, and is 
described as a series of specific statements that contra-
dict such authorities: as of May 21, 2020, it established 
a zero-tolerance policy for “content that contradicts the 
World Health Organisation or local health authorities’ 
guidance on treatment, prevention, diagnostic and trans-
mission.” (Figure 5). Such contents range from assertions 
“that COVID-19 doesn’t exist or that people do not die 
from it”; “that COVID-19 is caused by radiation from 
5G networks”; or that “the COVID-19 vaccine will kill 
people who received it.”[1] (YouTube, 2020) This hardline 
approach is justified by the presence of “content where 
accuracy and authoritativeness are key”, and that become 
in this case crucial to users’ health (YouTube, 2021). 
On the other hand, YouTube also maintains its 
demotion policy for borderline contents while increas-
ing its efforts to centralise access to authoritative sourc-
es on search, recommendation results and homepages 
(YouTube, 2021b). Contrary to hardline policies, demo-
tion grants some exceptions to problematic contents: 
“recommendations systems do not proactively recom-
mend [borderline] content”, but borderline videos may 
still “appear in recommendations for channel subscrib-
ers and in search results” (YouTube, 2021b). 
Hard moderation: deplatforming
The effects of “hard moderation” are especially 
palpable while examining the quantity of misinformation 
that appears through YouTube’s discovery mechanisms. 
We find that, after implementing its COVID-19 Medical 
Misinformation policy on May 21, 2021, the numbers of 
videos making conspiratorial claims decreased steadily 
we had to track the reason for their removal. Likewise, 
our method of measuring comments relied on unfiltered 
access to all comments posted on a given video. These 
were extracted from the raw data pulled by youtube-dl 
because querying for a removed video using YouTube’s 
API returns an error, as opposed to the video’s potential 
reason for removal; meanwhile, the comment endpoint 
of the API does not return all comments (c.f. m. davide, 
2019 and Armstead, 2020). This shows us that research 
that relies on officially-sanctioned platform APIs is not 
only temporally limited, but actually dealing with a dif-
ferent technical object than those of users (a user clicking 
a “dead” YouTube link will, indeed, find the reason for 
the video’s removal; a historical trace of problematic 
content that is hidden from the API endpoint).
Thus, our methods of our study simultaneously act 
as an argument for methodologies that elide mainstream 
platform APIs as generative for research. The information 
given by APIs is, to relative extents, a representational 
facsimile of the platform itself: APIs provide a particu-
lar image of  a programmatic access point to particular 
data, not the credentials to the platform’s databases 
itself. The API hides important elements relating to the 
historical presence of problematic content YouTube, 
and in turn hides the ability to measure how YouTube 
has related to the problematic content that it hosts over 
time. These lacks open up the possibility for researchers 
to offer not only analysis, but critical engagement and 
questioning that is attuned to the particular content and 
instantiation of misinformation and other content prob-
lematic to platform infrastructures themselves.
Findings
Hard and soft moderation  
on YouTube
Though YouTube’s conception of “misinforma-
tion” changed significantly since 2013, it has always 
opted for a mixture of deplatforming and demotion as 
a solution to any such kind of content. Until 2019, the 
closest mention of user-generated falsehoods ties mostly 
to artificial usages of the platform, or “Spam, decep-
[1] YouTube only makes one exception by August 29th, which it later removes: artistic or critical contents that violate this policy, 
in the condition they also grant equal balance to “countervailing views from local health authorities [...] or to medical or scientific 
consensus.” 
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Figure 5. Overview of YouTube’s Medical Misinformation policy.
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over two months, starting in late August, 2020. 
The third tendency is the effect of deplatform-
ing on demoting borderline videos. Queries related to 
Qanon, such as the Q motto “wwg1wga” (where we 
go one, we go all), were largely left undetected un-
til YouTube cracked down on the conspiracy around 
early October (Sandler, 2020). This highlights a sym-
biotic relationship between the two techniques; as 
evidenced by Figures 7, 8 and 9, in few instances do 
any of the two work independently of each other. 
Reactions to hard moderation 
How are hard and soft moderation techniques 
interpreted by affected users? At first glance, we see 
similarities with Myer West’s findings (2018) on the 
“stigmatised” status of moderated knowledge (Barkun, 
2017). In the absence of clear (and trusted) justifications 
for moderation, users effectively draw “connections be-
tween related phenomena, developing non-authoritative 
conceptions of why and how their content was removed” 
(Eslami et al., 2015 and Kempton, 1986 in Myers West, 
2018, 8). Users perceive moderation as an activity of 
YouTube engaging in the censorship and deletion of 
various undisclosed truths on the virus (Figure 10). 
Some complement the absence of clear reasons for 
deletion (see Annex) with more elaborate theorisations 
of YouTube’s motives for deleting contents, in that 
some claim that video testimony of doctors and nurses 
disappear as part of a general cover-up for the spread of 
crowdsourced information. In the position of the con-
spirator, YouTube is perceived as operating for political 
motives, with some users complaining that YouTube 
acts as “a liberal cesspool of swamp creatures.” 
The relations between a wider swath of conspirato-
rial narratives about the political affiliations and obscure 
motives of YouTube are made clearer in Figure 11, which 
indicates words that are associated with “YouTube’’ in 
user comments. As we move clockwise throughout the 
months the graph represents, we see a shift in commenters’ 
interpretations of the motives behind YouTube’s content 
moderation. While in March, commenters remarked 
that YouTube kept on “suspending”, “demonetising” 
or “manipulating” their contents, in May they accused 
the platform of “bias” and progressively of suppres-
sion, censorship and blacklisting. As critiques become 
suspicions of persecution, commenters formulate more 
elaborate explanations of YouTube’s political functions 
as covering governments, supporting pedophiles, or 
on the platform. Of all the 108,537 videos we captured, 
4,101 were unavailable by June, 2020 (Figure 6). Most 
of the moderation prompts that occurred stated sim-
ply that videos were removed for violating YouTube’s 
community guidelines, or were simply shown as un-
available or as belonging to a terminated user account. 
Only one small number of videos have been removed 
for inciting hatred, involving violence or harassment, 
or because of copyright claims (see Annex).
Looking at the types of content YouTube deleted 
(Figure 6), we find that YouTube targets specific claims 
listed in YouTube’s COVID-19 Medical Misinformation 
policy (Figure 5), namely allegations that COVID-19 is 
caused by 5G radiation; that vaccination is an operation 
to implement microchips; that the virus being a (Chinese) 
bioweapon or a concocted hysteria; claims that one can use 
prayers and other spiritual methods for treating the virus. 
Here, the hardline aspects of deplatforming are especially 
visible in the absence of tolerance for contents that are usu-
ally up to users’ discretion, namely religious beliefs. 
Soft moderation: demotion
We find three main tendencies within YouTube’s 
demotion of conspiratorial videos on COVID-19. The 
first is the effective demotion of videos making claims 
contrary to the World Health Organisation and local 
health authorities’ guidelines (for example, a video 
titled “Claims that COVID-19 is caused by radiation 
from 5G networks”) and “borderline contents” (both in 
red in Figure 7), as well as the up-ranking of videos by 
mainstream news channels or “authoritative sources” 
(in blue). This is particularly applicable to results for 
the query “id2020” (Figure 7). “Id2020” refers to a 
microchip that users allege will be sold in combina-
tion with COVID-19 vaccines promoted by Bill Gates; 
YouTube refers to variations of this conspiracy theory 
as “Claims that the COVID-19 vaccine will contain a 
microchip or tracking device.” (YouTube, 2020)
The second tendency, which casts doubt on long-
term effectiveness of the first, is the eventual resurfacing 
of borderline contents on top of search ranking results. 
We see that few borderline contents surface in search 
results for the query “COVID depopulation” up until July 
of 2020, which YouTube sanctions as  videos that “claim 
that the COVID-19 vaccine will be used as a means of 
population reduction” (Figure 8). In August of 2020, the 
video “IS THERE AN AGENDA BEHIND THIS VIRUS? 
- COVID-19 Government Agenda” remains on top for 
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Figure 6. Number of deplaformed videos and comments between April and October of 2020. Striped  
sections represent periods in which COVID-19 misinformation policies come into force.
Figure 6. Tf-idf network of all 4,101 banned videos, clustered by modularity.
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Figure 7. Demoted and up-ranked search results for the query “id2020”.
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Figure 8. Demoted and up-ranked search results for the query “depopulation”.
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Figure 9. Demoted and up-ranked search results for the query “wwg1wga”.
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pushing propaganda and other rhetoric. This final con-
stellation describes the through-lines that build between 
YouTube’s content moderation and a concern regarding 
the suppression of stigmatised truths (Krug, 2016).
Reactions to soft moderation
User reactions to demotion are illustrated by 
comments around “shadowbanning”, a vernacular 
term that refers to algorithmic interventions to reduce 
the visibility and spread of user-generated contents. 
Of note is a certain attunement to potential demotion: 
remarks that a specific video “does not come up at 
all in youtube search”, that certain contents “make it 
through [a] filter”, or that a video that was previously 
banned is now “coming to the light” (Figure 12). This 
supposed demotion is complemented by suspicions 
that personal characteristics, beliefs or sanctioned 
knowledge must be the object of persecution. Emerg-
ing from this is the suspicion that moderation is biased, 
which seems to violate YouTube’s claims to provide a 
platform — in the sense of a democratically-accessible 
venue for speech — for user-generated content (“They 
pretend to be platforms but they are not”). 
Still, YouTube’s interventions do not hamper 
the production of conspiratorial information altogether. 
“Authoritative” sources, like videos by scientific experts, 
local health authorities or mainstream news media, are 
typically the object of conspiratorial suspicions in the 
comment sections. One top ranking video for the query 
“depopulation”, “Empty Planet: Preparing for the Global 
Population Growth” by the Centre for International Gover-
nance Innovation, shows political scientist Darrell Bricker 
and journalist John Ibbitson having an armchair discussion 
around the thesis that, contrary to popular knowledge, the 
human population is likely to decline dramatically (Centre 
for International Governance Innovation, 2019). Com-
menters see this discussion as evidence that COVID-19 
is part of a covert plan to decrease the world’s human 
population, and that the speakers and the institutions 
they mention are enmeshed in an elite that knew of this 
policy far before the pandemic struck (Figure 13).
Conclusion
Through the combined historical analysis of content 
moderation techniques, the moderation techniques related 
to COVID-19 misinformation and their effects, this study 
Figure 10. Word tree for “youtube is deleting the”. Every line is a comment (n = 19 comments).
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Figure 12. Word tree for “shadowbanned” (n = 16 comments).
Figure 11. Subject-verb-object network of sentences mentioning YouTube, moderation and COVID-19 conspiracies. 
Colours indicate the months in which comments were uploaded. Line thickness indicates the strength of the 
n-grammatic association between the root word, “YouTube”, and the word at the end of the node.
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found that since 2013, YouTube has applied a combination 
of “hard” and “soft” moderation techniques to contain the 
spread of misinformation. The term “misinformation” is 
however quite new — and more controversial — to its 
repertoire of content moderation policies. The closest 
translation of this concept brings us back to YouTube’s 
Spam, deceptive practices and scam policies, which to this 
day aim to suppress false and actively harmful usages or 
appropriations of the platform: placing false video meta-
data; gaming the recommender system; posting the same 
contents repeatedly; or involving users in scams, blackmail 
and extortion. The circulation of contents that are not im-
mediately condemnable as doctored, coordinated or actively 
misinformative contents — what “comes close to [...] but 
doesn’t quite cross the line of — violating [...] Community 
Guidelines” — pushes the platform to both formulate its 
own conceptions of misinformation as “borderline con-
tent”, as well as the techniques it uses to contain it. 
The advent of COVID-19 as a public health cri-
sis has pushed the platform to take a far more proactive 
approach to moderating misinformation. At first sight, 
this approach is visible in YouTube’s choice to prioritise 
“authoritative sources” over contents produced by users 
at large, regardless of their popularity or affinity with 
user preferences. Despite the essentially contingent sta-
tus of knowledge on COVID-19, the platform has had to 
shrink its margin of tolerance for user-generated contents 
to a set of very specific statements about the virus. In 
the absence of stable markers of truth, these statements 
must facilitate user consensus or convergence around 
Figure 13. Screenshot of top-ranking comments for the video “Empty Planet: Preparing for the Global Population 
Growth”, taken on January 20th, 2021. User names and profile pictures have been anonymised.
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But the degree to which conspiracy theories are 
entangled with larger metahistorical precursors illus-
trates the difficulties in applying the binary logic of 
free-or-censored to thick webs of relation. For example, 
“authoritative” content may not contain misinformation, 
but may nevertheless be used to substantiate misinforma-
tion — such as videos showing intelligentsia discussing 
depopulation scenarios a few months before the pandemic. 
This indicates the ways that “authoritative sources” pig-
gyback  onto existing conspiracy narratives and, more 
importantly, illustrates the primary tension in the spread 
of misinformation: when ideas are networked so robustly, 
a single platform’s attempts to draw the line between 
what is acceptable and unacceptable makes a modest 
impact on their broader information ecology. 
What to make of this? While this question certainly 
can’t be answered with a case study on YouTube alone, our 
conclusion, for now, is that proactive and more explicit 
moderation contributes to modifying the relationship 
between platform and user. We have seen that, post-
deplatforming and demotion, YouTube is less a platform 
for conspiracy-making (i.e., sharing, discussing and amal-
gamating evidence of conspiracies) than a platform by and 
for the conspirators. That is to say that YouTube is not 
altogether abandoned by affected user bases, but is comple-
mented by the usage of platforms that afford conspiracy-
making — “alt-tech” sites such as Bitchute, Rumble, Parler 
or Telegram — as an archive of primary sources. 
scientific, political and media authorities, or “authorita-
tive sources”.  In this sense, the choice for authorita-
tive sources indicates an attempt to moderate possible 
excesses of factual contingency amongst users and the 
vacuums of (epistemic) leadership they may cause. 
This is also evident in a technical sense, through 
the use of deplatforming and demotion techniques. Both 
techniques act as correctives, where user-generated 
contents are either deleted or down-ranked in favour 
of authoritative statements. Though we have found a 
relatively small number of deplatformed videos (4,101 
between April and October 2020), we see that, combined 
with demotion techniques, moderation has more often 
than not successfully targeted “borderline contents” 
and misleading statements, despite occasional failures 
to capture all of them or newly emerging ones. 
Nevertheless, it is arguably the very success of 
deplatforming and demotion policies that render the 
platform vulnerable to misinformation. As YouTube 
actively qualifies and intervenes in user-generated con-
tents, its once invisible back-end measures and policies 
surface as operationalised biases. This personalisation 
of YouTube as an agent for partisan norms breaks the il-
lusion of universal platforms that Gillespie once located 
in the public-facing “discourse of platforms” (Gillespie, 
2013). The idea of a seemingly open host for user-
generated contents is, in this case, replaced by a critique 
that platforms are a universal space for instrumental-
izing partisanship, be it for users flagging, deleting and 
otherwise moderating each other, or for a normative 
body of thought from elites or the platform itself. 
This perceived encroachment sheds light on con-
temporary attitudes towards platforms. In such sociotech-
nical imaginaries (Jasanoff 2015, Bucher 2017), YouTube 
should only hold itself to the informational functions of a 
media platform, without intervening in the contents that 
YouTube functionally prefigures. This illustrates a “cogni-
tive mapping” (Jameson 1990) wherein the indiscriminate, 
purely functionalist rationality of the platform-as-code, 
or non-human agent, is imagined and understood as its 
“real” schema. The positive functions of YouTube’s mode 
of circulating videos — providing it a home, making it 
easy to access, and linking it together with similar video 
content — are taken not only as the platform’s function, 
but its purpose. Despite their entanglements with the very 
same code that sets up these positive functions, the acts 
of deplatforming, censorship, and demotion (in short, 
actions that impede free information circulation) are 
viewed as a violation of this imagined function.
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